Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss Games
JOSEPH BLOCHER* AND MARGARET H. LEMOS**
Historical practices can help define the separation of powers. One
branch’s claim of authority and another branch’s acquiescence can put a
“gloss” on the sparse text of Articles I–III, especially when repeated over
time. For example, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer—the opinion that coined the term “gloss”—turned on
whether Congress had acquiesced in the President’s asserted practice of
seizing private property during the course of armed conflict.1
In these “gloss games” there are always at least two players: the
branch that is claiming authority and the branch that is ceding it. Most
prior scholarship in this area focuses on contests between the legislative
and executive branches.2 Officials in these branches can assert authority in
various ways and when the same actions are repeated over time, they may
coalesce into a form of historical practice. Members of Congress can issue
statements, propose new laws, create and structure agencies, confirm
nominees for federal office, vote for or against legislation, and so on. The
President can make appointments, issue executive orders, veto legislation,
direct troops, and the like. These actions are not compelled by other
sources of law and may vary significantly from one actor (or set of actors)
to the next. The potential for variation is what gives weight to practices
that are “systematic, unbroken,” and unchallenged by the competing
branch.3
In Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial
Separation of Powers, Professors Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel challenge
scholars to consider how historical practice might illuminate a different set
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1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law
to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them.”); see also id. at 610–11 (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive
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of constitutional questions: those concerning Article III.4 Their principal
goal is to unveil a set of argumentative methodologies based in historical
practice; 5 they do so by revisiting and recasting historical episodes
involving “Court-packing” and “Court-stripping” (that is, restricting the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court based on substantive
disagreement on matters of law).6 Bradley and Siegel’s article suggests a
new avenue of inquiry for federal courts scholarship, and they demonstrate
convincingly that gloss and convention-based arguments—typically
deployed in disputes about the boundaries between Articles I and II—can
also shed light on questions about Article III.7
There is something striking about Bradley and Siegel’s historical
examples, however: they feature two-branch games over what are
arguably three-branch questions of authority. Although courts were the
central subjects of the disputes over Court-packing and Court-stripping,
courts were not really engaged in those disputes—at least not in ways that
involved the kinds of “practices” that animate conventional gloss-based
analysis. Participants in the debates made claims based on historical
practice, to be sure, but they were not talking about the conduct of courts
or judges. Instead, they were referring to legislative or executive practices.
In this response, we try to explain why courts were on the sidelines of
these gloss games and why other disputes over Article III are likely to
reflect a similar structure. The key, we think, lies in a distinctive feature of
judicial decision making: the doctrine of stare decisis. Although judicial
conduct may take various forms, the heart of the judicial function is
deciding cases. Those decisions are subject to a system of precedent that
gives them binding force and commands obedience by other judges. And
adherence to precedent is importantly distinct from the types of legislative
or executive practices that courts and commentators have treated as
constitutionally salient. The point of stare decisis is to ensure that
decisions in Case 2 and beyond are consistent with the decision in Case 1.
Precedent therefore limits the potential for variance in judicial practice

4. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions,
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255 (2016).
5. Id. at 260.
6. See id. at 269, 287.
7. Bradley and Siegel distinguish between gloss and conventions, both of which may
rest on historical practice. We focus here on gloss, though much of what we have to say
would apply as well to arguments based on conventions—at least to the extent that such
arguments turn on a pattern of power grabs and acquiescence repeated over time. For
more on conventions, see Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–94 (2013).
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and, in so doing, limits the reach of a practice-based approach to judicial
separation-of-powers disputes.8
I. THREE KINDS OF GLOSS GAMES INVOLVING THE COURTS
The threshold challenge in thinking about historical practices and the
courts is to identify the various roles courts might play in gloss games. At
least three different roles seem possible. First, courts might act as referees
in gloss games between the political branches. Second, courts might be the
subjects of disputes between Congress and the President concerning the
judiciary. Finally—and most importantly for our purposes—courts might
be players in gloss games with another branch (or branches) regarding the
judicial power.
A. COURTS AS REFEREES
Many disputes between Congress and the President never reach the
courts. Sometimes, however, courts act as referees between the political
branches. In such cases, courts might use the historical practices of the
political branches to illuminate the boundaries between Articles I and II.
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Youngstown is an example, 9 as is the
Court’s more recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning.10
These cases represent the standard story of a gloss game. In these
instances, the legislative and executive branches create the relevant gloss
in their interactions with one another, and the courts—if and when
presented with a case—rely on those interactions in resolving it. Although
courts assume a role in such disputes, they are not players in the relevant
gloss game.
8. Following Bradley and Siegel, we focus on a particular theory about why practice
matters. As noted in the text above, the theory of “historical gloss” credits practice
because it tells us something about how actors in different branches conceive of their
power and how they have resolved border disputes over the years. On that view, practices
that are repeated over time have special force because they represent the accumulated
judgment of a series of independent decision makers. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4,
at 261–65. It is of course possible to imagine different reasons why longstanding practice
might matter. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive
and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 535, 536 (2016) (offering a Burkean approach to historical practice under
which “past practice derives authority from its sheer pastness”). The features that
distinguish adherence to precedent from gloss-style “practice” may have less significance
for theories that do not turn on repetition and acquiescence.
9 . Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
10. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (acknowledging the
weight of prior practice); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 2 (describing the Noel
Canning Court’s invocation of historical practice to uphold the President’s power to
make recess appointments).
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B. COURTS AS SUBJECTS
In a second set of cases, the political branches are involved in a dispute
about the courts. Debates over Court-packing exemplify this kind of
dispute. When the political branches fight over the courts, the practices of
those branches might be relevant in resolving disputes between them. For
example, Congress might attempt to hold a current President to his
predecessor’s practice of not attempting to pack the Supreme Court. Or,
conversely, the President might argue that Congress has acquiesced
repeatedly to changes to the Court’s composition. In either direction, the
argument is that one branch has validly ceded territory to the other.
As Bradley and Siegel show, this is precisely what happened when
FDR proposed to pack the Court in 1937. Historical practices were
regularly invoked throughout the debates over FDR’s plan and were
treated by many as having something like constitutional status. 11 The
results of the game had important consequences for the courts,12 but the
practices in question were generally those of the political branches—not
the courts themselves.
C. COURTS AS PLAYERS
There is a third category of gloss game involving the federal judicial
power—one in which the courts are active players. Here, the courts are
directly involved in a conflict with another branch over the scope of the
federal judicial power. These cases differ from the first two categories
precisely because they involve the courts as participants in the gloss game.
In this category, courts’ own practices become part of the gloss-based
analysis, supplying evidence that courts have consistently asserted (or
assumed) a certain power or that they have consistently acquiesced in
power grabs by the other branches.
Disputes about the scope of judicial review or Court-stripping would
seem to be natural candidates for this category because they might pit the
judiciary against the political branches. Indeed, Bradley and Siegel’s
second major historical example involves various debates about the scope
of Congress’s authority to engage in Court-stripping. These debates are
illuminating in their own right, and Bradley and Siegel have further
enriched them by uncovering and describing a 1980s debate between John
Roberts, then a Justice Department lawyer, and Theodore Olson, then head
of the Office of Legal Counsel, regarding congressional authority to strip
11. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 274–75.
12. See Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the
Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J.
153, 157 (2003) (“To understand judicial independence and its limits, then, we must look
beyond ‘doctrinal’ independence as divined by courts, and examine the historical
development of ‘customary’ independence as it has emerged in Congress.”).

4

2016]

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

5

Supreme Court jurisdiction.13 Roberts, Olson, and others sought to buttress
their arguments with claims based on historical practice. But, again, the
practices they invoked were not those of the courts. When Roberts argued
in favor of the constitutionality of Court-stripping, the limited weight he
gave to historical practice focused on the actions of Congress. 14 In
response, Olson sought to downplay the fact that the first Judiciary Act did
not authorize the Court to exercise all of the appellate jurisdiction
established by Article III. He emphasized that Congress later created a
statutory regime under which the Court has broad appellate jurisdiction
and noted that “throughout our history there have been movements to curb
the Court’s jurisdiction which have never succeeded.”15
This is not to say that the Court had no influence on the debates; the
participants regularly invoked its actions. But in doing so, they focused
(properly, we think) on the Court’s core activity—deciding cases—and the
results of that activity—precedent. In particular, political actors on both
sides of the debates tried to make sense of the Court’s decision in Ex parte
McCardle, 16 which provided ambiguous authority for jurisdictionstripping.17 But the debaters did not treat McCardle, or any other judicial
decision, as a form of historical judicial practice. Instead, (and again,
properly) they treated precedent as a conceptually distinct source of
authority.
II. HOW COURTS CREATE GLOSS: PRACTICE AND PRECEDENT
Why do we not see courts playing a more active role in gloss games
about the judicial separation of powers? We think the answer has to do
with stare decisis—a doctrine unique to the courts. Actions by members of
the legislative and executive branches do not trigger formal rules of
precedent. Tomorrow’s President is not bound (at least not as tightly as a
judge) to interpret Article II in the same way as today’s. That decisional
freedom is critical to the theory of historical gloss: The potential for
variation is what makes it meaningful when different political actors
coalesce around a shared vision of their constitutional authority. But
actions by courts often are binding, and the consequence is to leave less
room for the accumulation of historical practice.

13. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 302–311.
14. Id. at 305–06.
15. Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Ex parte McCardle,74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
17. See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 305 (recounting Olson’s argument
that McCardle “is simply the most prominent in a long and consistent line of judicial
opinions reading the exceptions clause as meaning exactly what it says.”).

5

6

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE
A.

[VOL. 106:1

OBEDIENCE VS. AGREEMENT

Gloss-based reasoning relies on a particular form of government
action. The relevant actions tend to be those followed continuously over
time not because of a strong sense of legal obligation (at least not
initially), but because successive decision makers either agree with, or
defer to, the decisions of their predecessors. Such practices become
constitutionally salient in large part because they are not obligatory at any
given moment, but rather reflect a consistent series of choices—ideally
independent of factors like party identity 18 —made by actors within a
branch.
Some actions by members of the judicial branch seem to fit this mold.
Judges can give speeches, testify before Congress, or adopt rules to govern
the procedures of their courts. They can also follow certain conventions in
the course of deciding cases: they can sit en banc or in panels, issue
concurring or dissenting opinions, write dicta, follow majority rule in the
resolution of cases, adhere to the “rule of four” in granting writs of
certiorari, and so on. Such actions might vary over time and between
actors, and we might assess them in much the same way as we assess
“practice” by legislative or executive actors.
These exercises of soft power can be quite important, especially within
the domain of internal judicial administration. And although they seem
unlikely to have the kind of constitutional weight in interbranch disputes
that would bring them within the framework Bradley and Siegel describe,
it is not out of the question that past judicial practices could be
persuasively deployed in a dispute between the judiciary and the political
branches over funding, staffing, facilities, confirmations, or perhaps even
jurisdiction. Bradley and Siegel note, for example, that “[r]esponding to
concerns expressed by the Court that it was overburdened with mandatory
appeals,” Congress repeatedly “made ‘exceptions’ to the Court’s
mandatory appellate jurisdiction” and gave it more control over its
docket.19
But the picture changes when we consider the conduct at the very core
of the judicial power—the actual decisions in cases and controversies.20
18. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 460 (arguing that it matters that both
Democratic and Republican administrations have claimed the power to conduct certain
military operations without congressional authority).
19 . Bradley & Siegel, supra note 4, at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1835, 1846 (2015)).
20. Cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 22
(2014) (“[W]hile there may be an intriguing debate to be had about the contours of
judicial self-help, it is likely to remain a rarefied debate so long as we limit ourselves to
irregular or judge-initiated practices and exclude the bulk of judicial review.”).
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When judges decide cases, they create precedent. And precedent is distinct
from the kinds of practices that animate gloss-based reasoning.21 Stare
decisis gives presumptive, binding power to earlier decisions based not on
the accumulation of agreement but on the authority of the decision
maker. 22 That authority does not depend on whether the decision in
question is part of a “systematic [and] unbroken” practice pursued over
time; 23 a single case on a matter of first impression can establish
precedent. Lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of higher
courts, regardless of any prior practice or what they might think about the
wisdom of those decisions.
Precisely because (and to the degree that) precedent has binding force,
the inferences that we can draw from consistent judicial action over time
are weaker than in the traditional gloss context. The executive and
legislature may see a strategic advantage in following the practices of their
forbears and perhaps some obligation to defer to them in the absence of
strong disagreement. But the notion of precedent means that courts are
bound more strongly to their own past actions. As a result, their
consistency is overdetermined: It may simply be a function of obedience,
not of agreement or endorsement. And to the extent that it is the former, it
is not the kind of considered historical practice that matters in a gloss
game.
As an example, consider the converse of jurisdiction-stripping: the
question of jurisdiction-declining, which presents the same kind of
interbranch dispute that typically gives rise to invocations of gloss. Can a
federal court decline to exercise jurisdiction that has been vested in it by

21. But cf. Young, supra note 8, at 563 (noting that “[w]e generally think of judicial
precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis as their own modality of interpretation—not
part of a broader reliance on historical practice,” but arguing that “[t]he influence that
past decisions have in resolving present controversies” is itself an “example of judicial
reliance on past practice”). Professor Young takes pains to distinguish the theory of
historical practice that he advances from the more familiar gloss analysis that Bradley
and Siegel employ, and that is the focus here. See id. at 557 (“Burke’s notion that practice
derives its authority from longstanding usage—that the past has authority simply because
it is the past—runs counter to much contemporary discussion of historical practice as an
aid to constitutional interpretation. That literature tends to ground the force of practice in
the acquiescence of critical actors.”).
22. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989)
(“[I]f incorrectness were a sufficient condition for overruling, there would be no
precedential constraint in statutory and constitutional cases.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
68, 73 (1991) (supporting the “traditional view that precedents should be overruled only
when the prior decision was wrongly decided and there is some other important
disadvantage in respecting that precedent”).
23 . Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Article III and by statute? When faced with a tedious or difficult diversity
case, for instance, can the court simply demur?
The answer is, “it depends.” The Court has held repeatedly that federal
courts have the “duty . . . to decide questions of state law whenever
necessary to the rendition of a judgment.”24 But there are exceptions to
that rule—exceptions that form the complicated doctrines of abstention
that federal courts scholars know and love. For our purposes, the details of
those doctrines are not important. What matters is that they are doctrines.
When a court today is confronted with the choice between deciding a case
within its jurisdiction or abstaining, it has a long line of cases to guide it.
And those cases are not just useful; they are authoritative.
Suppose, then, that our hypothetical court decides to exercise
jurisdiction over the case. Is that decision further evidence in favor of the
view “that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that
is conferred upon them by Congress”?25 Is it, in other words, an act of
acquiescence—a relevant practice for gloss analysis? Not really. It is an
act of obedience—not to Congress, but to precedent.
We do not mean to overstate the binding nature of precedent nor to
minimize its malleability. There are many ways for courts to evade,
narrow, distinguish, and sometimes even overrule precedent. But even a
strongly skeptical view of precedent must concede that courts are more
tightly bound to their predecessors than presidents or legislators are to
theirs. At the very least, the doctrine of stare decisis changes the
conversation from one about historical practice and acquiescence to one
about the rule of law and fidelity to precedent.
B. STARE DECISIS: PRACTICE IN THE SHADOW OF PRECEDENT
After precedent has been established, practices of various kinds may
still be relevant going forward. Judges can continue to give speeches,
write books, or testify before Congress on matters of interest, including
matters that are governed by precedent. And although judges are obligated
to follow precedent, they are free to criticize it, either in dissent or as they
grudgingly go along. Thus, decisions in the wake of precedent may not
reflect obedience and nothing else—there is often room left for
independent decision making. If these actions are sufficiently widespread
and continuous, they could constitute a species of historical judicial
practice.
In what way might such post-precedent practices matter? First, they
might affect the future vitality of some precedent. The distinction between
matters that are governed by precedent and those that are not will not
24. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
25. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996).
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always be clear, and judges have substantial discretion to interpret
precedent narrowly or expansively. Judicial practices—public criticism,
grumbling dicta, congressional testimony, and the like—may influence
those decisions as to scope. For example, an oft-criticized precedent might
be interpreted narrowly, thus leaving a wider range for cases of first
impression (which might, in turn, incorporate practices).
Even where precedent is plainly on point, judicial practice might
matter within the traditional stare decisis inquiry. Imagine that the
Supreme Court is reconsidering the constitutionality of judicial review—
perhaps the paradigmatic legal issue pitting courts against the political
branches where constitutional text is unclear—214 years after deciding
Marbury v. Madison.26 We know from courts’ consistent decisions over
many, many years that they think they can invalidate legislative and
executive actions as unconstitutional. But we also know that from reading
Marbury itself.
If today’s Supreme Court took up the question whether to overrule
Marbury, the long line of cases exercising judicial review since Marbury
would be considered through the lens of stare decisis. Certainly, the
judiciary’s treatment of Marbury in the intervening years would be
relevant to that analysis. When courts determine whether to reconsider an
established precedent, they consider a list of factors, including
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability[,] whether the rule is subject
to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost
of repudiation[,] whether related principles of law have so
far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine[,] or whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.27
Post-precedent judicial practice—even in the form of public criticism or
endorsement—might be relevant to at least the first, third, and fourth of
these factors.
It should come as no surprise that judicial practices might inform
courts’ application of stare decisis; the reasons for adherence to precedent
are similar—in some respects, at least—to the reasons for reliance on
historical practice. For example, both approaches respect the accumulated
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
27. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–
55 (1992) (citations omitted).
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wisdom of prior practice28 but permit change in response to “real world”
necessities. 29 Given these similarities, one might conclude that the
doctrine of stare decisis absorbs and translates the sort of historical gloss
analysis courts employ in the absence of precedent. On that view, courts
are asking a similar question in both contexts but using different language
to describe their inquiry.
Though we think the overlap is worthy of attention, it is also important
to attend to the differences between the analysis demanded by the doctrine
of stare decisis and the analysis we see in cases like Youngstown or, more
recently, Noel Canning. To return to our Marbury example, even if
Marbury had been criticized—in other words, even if the courts’ practice
had been far from uniform—stare decisis would still place a heavy thumb
on the scale in favor of precedent. Stare decisis is all about settlement for
the sake of settlement; it only takes one case to lock in a resolution.30 On a
gloss analysis, by contrast, courts (and other observers) look for evidence
of interbranch agreement that emerges over time. A decision by one
branch might be a move, but it is not the whole game. If an issue is
eventually settled politically, then good reasons kick in for other actors to
respect that settlement—and, as we’ve seen, those reasons tend to dovetail
with the reasons for adherence to precedent. But stare decisis flips the
burden of persuasion: Once the Supreme Court acts, its move is final
unless a persuasive case can be made for change.
C. MORE PRECEDENT, LESS PRACTICE
When precedent clearly speaks to an issue, it (like other sources of
binding law) tends to crowd out practice. Precedent takes away the
discretion—the potential for variation—that otherwise makes consistent
practice constitutionally meaningful. This point is not limited to the
Article III context, but applies to gloss-based analysis more generally.
When the Supreme Court weighs in on a question, the political branches
have to listen, too, regardless of their prior practices.31 Thus, as other work
28. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 414 (“[A]cquiesced-in government
practices are sometimes privileged on the theory that they embody wisdom accumulated
over time and are unlikely to threaten the basic balance of power between Congress and
the Executive.”).
29. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (noting the relevance of changing law and fact).
30. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
31. See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008) (arguing
that the President must enforce a judgment regardless of agreement but may ignore a
judgment if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction); cf. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 2, at
63 (noting the “inherent tension between the benefits of customary evolution and
centralized judicial review. Given the authority that federal courts possess in our
constitutional system today, practice is likely to coordinate around judicial decisions. As
a result, a judicial decision crediting practice has the potential to freeze the practice in
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on historical gloss makes clear, historical practices are most significant in
separation of powers disputes where judicial review is most limited.32
This helps to explain why gloss-based arguments have been deployed
most frequently in disputes between the political branches: Such disputes
are often nonjusticiable. The same will be true of many questions
concerning the boundaries of the judicial power. 33 If, for example,
Congress were to pass a law requiring publication of certiorari votes, in
contravention of longstanding judicial practice, 34 it is not immediately
clear whether anyone would have standing to challenge it.
Nevertheless, as a relative matter, disputes about the courts’ own
powers seem more likely to present justiciable controversies than disputes
about the distribution of authority between the political branches.
Compared to contests over Articles I and II, controversies about Article III
appear to be poor candidates for the political question doctrine—at least to
the extent that application of the doctrine turns on “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department.”35 And, given that the federal judicial power extends
only to cases or controversies—disputes that, by definition, already have
parties—standing is unlikely to pose an obstacle to the adjudication of
many questions about the specifics of that power. If Congress tried to
legislate on any of the procedural practices noted above (the size of
judicial panels, the form of judicial opinions, the tradition of majority
vote, etc.), the statute could immediately be challenged by parties involved
in the affected cases. Jurisdiction-stripping statutes would seem to pose a
serious challenge for judicial review because they take away courts’ power
to adjudicate certain disputes. Yet, even when they have conceded the loss
of jurisdiction, courts generally have found ways to weigh in on the
constitutional questions.36
To be sure, a precedent-setting decision might well be informed by
historical practice. With regard to matters of first impression, judges could

place.”). We bracket here debates about departmentalism. See generally Baude, supra
note 31, at 1815–16 (explaining departmentalism).
32. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 415.
33. See Grove, supra note 19, at 1836 (“As in other separation of powers arenas,
many important questions arising under Article III have rarely, if ever, reached the
judiciary and have instead been addressed by the political branches.”).
34. Cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Secret Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/opinion/the-supreme-courtssecret-power.html?_r=0\ [https://perma.cc/Z3CD-NUGK] (arguing that the Court itself
should do away with the practice).
35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). But cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S.
224 (1993) (using the political question doctrine to rebuff a challenge to the procedures
used by the Senate to “try” a judicial impeachment).
36. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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consider the kinds of practices described above.37 Suppose, for example,
that Congress passes a law forbidding the publication of dissenting
opinions by the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals. A court
considering a challenge to this novel law might purport to do so on the
basis of constitutional principles regarding judicial independence and
decisional authority. But it might also invoke longstanding but
nonprecedential judicial practices with respect to the publication of
opinions. From that point forward, however, the precedent is what
governs—the practices no longer have the same independent significance.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARTICLE III GLOSS GAMES
We’ve argued that courts are likely to weigh in on questions
concerning the judicial separation of powers via precedent rather than by
engaging in the sorts of practices that typically inform arguments about
historical gloss. What are the implications for gloss analysis in the Article
III context—in the areas that Bradley and Siegel explore, and others like
them?
One takeaway is that, as we expand the frame for gloss analysis to
include Article III questions, it becomes particularly important to identify
the relevant players. In Justice Frankfurter’s original formulation, the
question in Youngstown was whether one political branch had acquiesced
in a longstanding assertion of authority by the other.38 But acquiescence is
only meaningful if the proper party is acquiescing. To take an extreme
example, it would make no sense to say that the courts had “acquiesced”
in a President’s claim of unilateral authority to make war without
congressional authorization: The relevant power is not theirs to waive.
Likewise, to the extent that courts have a legitimate role to play in
defining the scope of the federal judicial power—a matter on which we
express no opinion—any “acquiescence” by a political branch should be
37. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (“‘[T]raditional
ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution. Our 200-year
tradition of extrajudicial service is additional evidence that the doctrine of separated
powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity.”)
(omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (rejecting the argument that “judges of the supreme court have
no right to sit as circuit judges” on the ground that “practice and acquiescence under it for
a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system,
affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction”).
38. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by §
1 of Art. II.”).
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largely irrelevant, or at least not dispositive. The political branches might
rely on their own historical practices to resolve disputes as between
themselves, and in that sense they might be involved in a two-branch gloss
game. But whatever settlement Congress and the President reach cannot
fully resolve the underlying question if the relevant powers are not theirs
to waive.
Thus, while gloss analysis can help solve constitutional puzzles, it also
creates new puzzles of its own. Identifying the proper parties in gloss
games will often turn on difficult questions about the Constitution’s
allocation of authority among the branches. For example, suppose the text
of the Constitution is unclear as to whether the President or Congress gets
to control the size of the Court, but that the text is clear that the Court
itself has no say in the matter. Through that lens, the relevant gloss game
is the one played between the political branches—power over the Court is
just the spoils of the war. But if one believes that the Constitution is not
clear on the matter (or even that past practice makes it unclear),39 then the
courts themselves might also have a valid role to play in the gloss game.
A second set of takeaways concerns the possible advantages that stare
decisis might bestow on courts. Previous scholarship has noted that the
President has a leg up in gloss games against Congress, given the
executive branch’s more unitary structure and institutional memory
(including OLC’s own commitment to internal precedent). 40 So too,
perhaps, with courts. The judiciary’s hierarchical structure and
commitment to stare decisis allow it to avoid many of the collective action
problems that plague multimember institutions and to commit to a
common course of conduct, even in the face of disagreement and dissent.
Granted, if the first decision establishing the precedent is power-denying
rather than power-grabbing, obedience to precedent will work against the
courts rather than in their favor. But the same is true of the executive. To
the extent one believes that, all else equal, each branch would prefer to
expand its power than to contract it, 41 then the courts’ commitment to
precedent should make them particularly powerful players in Article III
gloss games.

39. The existence of long-standing practices might impact the perceived clarity of
constitutional commands. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed
Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015).
40. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In
any controversy between the political branches over a separation-of-powers question,
staking out a position and defending it over time is far easier for the Executive Branch
than for the Legislative Branch.”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 2, at 438–47.
41. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). For a skeptical view, see generally Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005).
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Notably, moreover, precedent-setting decisions are relatively unlikely
to cede power because of historical practice. That is, it is difficult (though
not impossible42) to think of examples in which a case of first impression
might feature a history of acquiescence by the courts. Suppose that
Congress makes an aggressive move, like the “no dissenting opinions”
statute above. And suppose we’re right to think that such a statute could
immediately be challenged. On the one hand, historical practice would be
of little help to Congress in that scenario: This is the first such statute.
(Perhaps practice could be relevant on Congress’s side of the contest if
many prior bills had been proposed but rejected for unrelated reasons, but
there would probably be no judicial acquiescence in that scenario.) On the
other hand, practice could support the courts’ side. We can imagine a
court’s reasoning: “We have always decided whether or not to publish our
opinions, and Congress has never before claimed the power to tell us
otherwise.” It seems possible, then, that gloss games in which courts are
players will tend to function as a one-way ratchet favoring the courts.
CONCLUSION
Professors Bradley and Siegel have shed much-needed light on the
intersection between historical gloss analysis and the judicial power. In
this response, we have suggested that the institution of stare decisis may
limit the purview of gloss analysis in the Article III context—or, at the
very least, that courts will not “play” gloss games in quite the same way as
the political branches. These are just a few of the important and difficult
questions elicited by Bradley and Siegel that will enrich history-based
federal courts scholarship going forward.

42. See Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 307 (invoking “acquiescence” by founding-era
justices as authoritative).
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